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Performance Royalties for Sound
Recordings on Terrestrial Radio: A
Private Solution to a Public Problem
ABSTRACT
US copyright law provides for a digital performance right in
sound recordings but does not provide for a performance right in sound
recordings when broadcast over terrestrial radio. Proponents of this
asymmetry posit that the difference relates to the promotional value of
terrestrial radio to record labels, but this rationale has eroded in recent
years. The recording industry experienced a drastic decline at the turn
of the millennium, and record labels have attempted many creative
approaches to bridging the profit gap. Major labels and radio
conglomerates of late have begun negotiating private contracts that
effectively extend the benefits of a performance right to sound
recordings broadcast over terrestrial radio. This Note argues that
Congress should allow these private parties to continue experimenting
with these agreements. As it stands, the government's regulation of
digital performance of sound recordings is creating negative
consequences, and Congress should only intervene in the terrestrial
radio arena if a holdout problem arises.
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The complex technological and commercial trajectory of the
laws governing the recording industry left performing artists and
sound-recording owners without performance royalties for
terrestrial radio play.1 US copyright law only requires payments to
publishers and songwriters through performing-rights organizations
like the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC (originally the
Society of European Stage Authors & Composers).2 These societies act
as intermediaries between radio stations and the copyright owners of
the compositions transmitted. 3 With the extreme downturn in the
industry,4 record labels and performing artists have searched for any
means possible to tap into new revenue streams that might fill the
profit gap that remains after music went digital.5 In 1995, Congress
passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
(DPRA), which called for the addition of "digital transmission" to the
definitions section of Title 17 of the United States Code.6
1. See infra Part I (detailing the developments leading to the lack of a full performance
right in sound recordings).
2. About SESAC, SESAC, http://www.sesac.com/About/About.aspx (last visited Aug.
10, 2013) ("Though the company name was once an acronym, today it is simply SESAC and not
an abbreviation of anything."); see 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012); infra Part I.B (explaining the role of
performing-rights organizations and the legislation that creates an asymmetry between Internet
and terrestrial radio).
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. The causes of the industry's decline are beyond the scope of this Note, but some
suggested causes include file sharing, technology increases, the economy generally, and others.
See, e.g., Kristina Groennings, Note, An Analysis of the Recording Industry's Litigation Strategy
Against Direct Infringers, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 389 (2005) (citing file sharing as the main
cause of the industry's troubles).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(5) (2012); infra Part I.B.
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Because of the DPRA, free streaming services, like digital
radio, and subscription services, like Rhapsody and Spotify, must pay
public performance royalties to artists, labels, and other legal and
beneficial owners of sound recordings based on section 114 of Title 17.
7
The statute mandates that each type of streaming service divide
royalties among industry parties.8
As the DPRA's name implies, Congress limited its extension of
the sound-recording performance royalties to digital broadcasters. It
did not require traditional terrestrial radio stations to pay
sound-recording performance royalties, leaving sound recordings with
an asymmetrical performance right.9 US copyright law continues to
require radio stations to pay performance royalties to
performing-rights organizations-and thus to publishers and
songwriters-but that revenue stream does not flow to record labels
and artists. 10 Traditional arguments against paying performance
royalties to record labels and artists rest on the premise that radio
serves as a free promotional tool for record labels, so terrestrial radio
stations owe no money to the labels and artists-reasoning that is
much less convincing today than in previous decades.11
Recently, however, some members of the recording industry
began a push toward extending the performance royalties required of
webcasters for digital transmissions to terrestrial radio. 12  For
example, Big Machine Label Group signed deals with Clear Channel
Communications and Entercom Communications in June 2012 and
September 2012.13 These are two massive radio-station
conglomerates, with Clear Channel owning over one third of all US
radio stations. 14 Although the details remain confidential, these
private deals seem to fix the anachronistic difference between
terrestrial and streaming radio while allowing ongoing market
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2012); What is Rhapsody?, RHAPSODY, http://www.
rhapsody.com/what-is-rhapsody/what-is-rhapsody.html (last visited July 22, 2013); About Us,
SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about-us/contact/ (last visited July 22, 2013); infra Part I.B.
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2012) (listing the copyright owner of the sound recording,
nonfeatured musicians, nonfeatured vocalists, and recording artists or artists featured on the
sound recording (or "persons conveying rights in the artists' performance in the sound
recording").
9. See id. § 114(d).
10. See id. § 114(d)(1)(A) (exempting non-subscription broadcast transmissions); infra
Part I.B.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See Ed Christman, Exclusive: Clear Channel, Big Machine Strike Deal to Pay
Sound-Recording Performance Royalties to Label, Artists, BILLBOARD (June 5, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://www.billboard.biz[bbbiz/industry/legal-and-management/exclusive-clear-channel-big-
machine-strike-1007226762.story; infra Part III.
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negotiations, a flexible market-based solution that stands in stark
contrast to ossifying legislation in other areas of copyright law.15
The federal government should allow the private sector to
continue remedying the asymmetry between the treatment of
performance royalties in sound recordings on Internet radio and
terrestrial radio until government intervention actually becomes
necessary. Part I describes the decline of the industry and the current
laws that govern it. Part II analyzes changing industry conditions
that demand a new revenue stream in performance royalties for sound
recordings and the drawbacks of legislative attempts to force the
creation of that revenue stream. Part III suggests that Congress
postpone intervention, allowing the private sector to develop an
efficient marketplace between labels and radio stations until all that
remains is a holdout problem.
I. REVENUE IN THE RECORDING INDUSTRY: A STRUGGLING BUSINESS
MODEL
Many different factors contributed to the ongoing decline in the
recording industry, but the fact of its occurrence is irrefutable. 16
Although musicians will continue to create music, the industry that
produces quality recordings for eager listeners depends on a reliable
source of revenue. 17 In a move to grant labels and artists another
revenue source, Congress granted record labels and artists a
performance right in digital transmissions but not in terrestrial radio
transmissions.1 8 The treatment of entertainment technology in two
US Supreme Court cases demonstrates the effects of government
remedies in the industry. 19
A. Declining Sales and Falling Profits
The recording industry has been in a depression since the turn
of the millennium. 20 Until the late 1990s, retailers sold most recorded
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (describing the theoretical
underpinnings to the US copyright system).
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. See generally, e.g., Arista Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding in favor of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and taking down
file-sharing service Napster for infringement); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F.




music on compact discs (CDs), and CD sales generated ample profits
to fuel the then-thriving industry.
21
With the advent of peer-to-peer file sharing and the means to
store and listen to music without the inconvenience of physical media
like the CD, the music business declined unexpectedly, leaving the
recording industry in shambles. 22  Since then, record labels,
publishers, performing-rights organizations, performing artists,
songwriters, and Congress have attempted to restore order to what
remains of the business. 23  Despite these efforts, the recording
industry remains in a depressed state, which negatively affects all
parties involved.
24
Before peer-to-peer file sharing took hold of a substantial share
of the music distribution market, the recording industry experienced
all-time-high profits, with its total annual revenue exceeding $14.6
billion in 1999.25 By 2009, however, the industry's total annual
revenue plummeted to a mere $6.3 billion. 26 Forrester Research
predicted that if the recording industry continues on its current
trajectory, revenues could bottom out at $5.5 billion per year in 2014.27
Industry players began targeting other revenue streams because of
the sharp decline in CD sales and the fact that digital sales have not
filled that profit gap.
28
21. See David Goldman, Music's Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half, CNN MONEY (Feb. 3,
2010, 9:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster-music-industry; see
also Sam Gustin, Digital Music Sales Finally Surpassed Physical Sales in 2011, TIME (Jan. 6,
2012), http://business.time.com2012/01/06/digital-music-sales-finally-surpassed-physical-sales-
in-2011/ (stating that digital sales surpassed physical sales in 2011 and that CDs and licensing
generated the majority of revenue in the 1990s).
22. See Goldman, supra note 21; see also Karl Taro Greenfield, Chris Taylor & David E.
Thigpen, Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60 (explaining that peer-to-peer services, more
specifically Napster, operate by allowing users to download files directly from other users'
computers, allowing free and rapid file dissemination).
23. See generally, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding in favor of the RIAA and affirming the district court's preliminary injunction shutting
down file-sharing service Napster for infringement); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680
F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (illustrating that the RIAA turned its strategy to suing
individual file-sharers).
24. See Goldman, supra note 21.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. This Note does not attempt to explain all of the potential causes or proposed
solutions for this staggering downfall, but these numbers are a vivid illustration of the problems
the industry faces.
28. Id.; Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. § 114
(2006) [hereinafter DPRA] (requiring webcasters to pay performance royalties to the owners of
sound recordings).
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B. Laws Controlling Performance Royalties
One major problem for Congress, as well as for industry parties
like labels and publishers, is that technologies-predominantly mobile
and Internet technologies-advance too rapidly for the law to keep
pace. 29 The authors of the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) could not
have envisioned the new revenue streams that the industry has
embraced, and as the market changed, the law lagged behind. 30
The 1976 Act granted copyright holders the rights to reproduce,
publicly perform, and publicly display their works, as well as the right
to create derivative works. 31 A sound recording, one of the categories
of works that the 1976 Act protects, contains two independently
copyrightable aspects: the recording itself and the underlying
composition.
32
Under the 1976 Act, the public-performance right applied only
to the underlying composition of a recording and not to the recording
itself.33 The DPRA updated this aspect in the mid-1990s. Congress
drafted the DPRA to blunt the impact of technological changes that
made music portability and Internet streaming increasingly attractive
to listeners.34 The DPRA requires streaming and interactive services,
such as iTunes Radio, Rhapsody, Spotify, Pandora, and Last.fm, to
pay public-performance royalties both to performing-rights
organizations for performance of the composition and to record labels
for performance of the sound recording based on section 114 of Title
17.3
Section 114 mandates that streaming services pay online
performance royalties to performing-rights organizations, which then
29. See generally Groennings, supra note 4, at 389 (describing how the RIAA won
against Napster, but file-sharing technology advanced to a decentralized system that made
piracy much more difficult to monitor and prevent).
30. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012).
31. Id.
32. See Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue?: An Exploration of the Status and Merit of
a General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 181, 182
(2004).
33. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012); see also infra Part II.A (describing the long-held
arguments underlying the lack of a performance right in sound recordings-namely that labels
used radio to promote their repertoires).
34. See Interview with Patrick Sullivan, CEO, RightsFlow, Inc. (Sept. 28, 2010) (stating
that portability is one of the main components of future success in music-industry profitability).
35. Performing-rights organizations such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC collect
performance royalties from venues, webcasters, radio stations, and other music-transmittal
outlets. See ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); BMI,




distribute them evenly between songwriters and publishers. 36
Performance royalties for sound-recording plays on the Internet follow
a different rubric than the performance royalties paid for the
underlying composition; this difference takes into account nonfeatured
performers on the recording, as demonstrated in the table below:
37
Receiving Party Percentage of
Royalties
Copyright owner of the exclusive right to publicly 50%
perform a sound recording by means of a digital
audio transmission.
Recording artist or artists featured on such sound 45%
recording (or the persons conveying rights in the
artists' performance in the sound recordings)
Nonfeatured instrumental musicians through the 2.5%
American Federation of Musicians (AFM)
Nonfeatured vocalists through the American 2.5%
Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(AFTRA)
Private companies act as middlemen for the licensing
transactions between online services, on the one hand, and the labels
and artists on the other.38  RightsFlow, Inc., for instance, manages
licensing among interactive streaming services and industry entities
so that record companies and artists can worry about creating and
marketing music instead of dealing with multiple complex licensing
agreements. 39  Similarly, non-interactive streaming services like
Internet radio stations pay public-performance royalties to
SoundExchange, a nonprofit performing-rights organization that
collects and distributes royalties for streams of recordings and based
on the percentages detailed above.
40
Under the DPRA, when Internet radio owners and copyright
holders are unable to negotiate a royalty rate, the Copyright Royalty
Board (CRB), a committee under the auspices of the Library of
Congress, "establish[es] rates and terms that most clearly represent
the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the
36. See, e.g., General Royalty Information, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/
generalinformation/detail (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (2012) (setting the royalty-distribution percentages).
38. See Labels and Distributors, RIGHTSFLOW, http://rightsflow.com/what-we-doflabels-
and-distributors (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); About, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.
soundexchange.com/about (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
39. See Labels and Distributors, supra note 38.
40. See About, supra note 38.
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marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller."41 Many
factors affect this determination, but the goal is to determine a
reasonable price based on this "hypothetical market" is the goal.42 In
2007, when the CRB made its first ruling, some webcasters
experienced royalty-rate increases of up to 1,200 percent.43
Previous US copyright law did not cover digital audio
transmissions, but the DPRA's selective addition of required payments
to record labels and performing artists set the stage for developing
tensions between Internet and terrestrial radio broadcasters. 44 While
Internet radio stations faced new fees for the sound recordings as well
as the underlying compositions, terrestrial radio stations continued to
pay only for the underlying compositions that sound recordings
embody.4
5
On the opposite end of the revenue stream, a mirror-image
tension exists between record labels (and their artists) and publishers
(and their songwriters). Record labels and artists receive no income
from performances of their recordings on AM or FM radio stations, but
songwriters and publishers do receive royalties from similar
performances of their compositions. 46  This difference entitles
publishers and songwriters to payments that have been completely
unavailable to record labels and performers. 47
C. Sony and Grokster: Judicial Decisions in the Entertainment
Industries
As described above, Congress has been active in attempting to
adapt laws to advancing industry technologies. 48 The judicial branch
has been equally influential on the state of the industry.49 Two
Supreme Court decisions, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
41. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2012); see also Rate Proceedings, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.govlcrblrate (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (providing updates of the status of rate
proceedings).
42. Blake Holland, Note, The Winding Stream: Entitlement Theories and Intellectual
Property Rights in Emerging Media Technologies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 247, 265 (2010).
43. See Mark D. Robertson, Note, Sparing Internet Radio from the Real Threat of the
Hypothetical Marketplace, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 543 (2008).
44. See Lauren E. Kilgore, Note, Guerrilla Radio: Has the Time Come for a Full
Performance Right in Sound Recordings?, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 549, 562 (2010) (citing Lee
Grossman, Learning to Love Your Inner Pirate, TIME, June 4, 2007, at 54, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/O,9171,1625209,00.html); infra Part II.A.
45. See Kilgore, supra note 44, at 563-64.
46. See id.
47. See infra Part II.A.
48. See supra Part I.B.
49. See infra Part IL.E.
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Studios, Inc.50 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.,51 made significant impacts.
1. Sony: Allowing Commercial Progress
Devices that increase access to copyrighted material may be
used for either legal or illegal purposes, which is especially true for
devices that bring copyrighted material to consumers.5 2 In Sony, the
Supreme Court analyzed whether home videotape recorders (VTRs)
were capable of substantial non-infringing uses (the legal standard for
one defense against contributory copyright infringement) to determine
whether the manufacture and sale of such devices constituted
contributory infringement of the respondents' copyrights.5 3  The
respondents, representatives of television studios, worried that
allowing consumers to record live television with the petitioners'
devices would decrease licensing revenue and harm the commercial
value of their copyrights.54 Ultimately the Court decided that because
VTRs were indeed capable of substantial non-infringing uses, their
manufacture and sale did not infringe upon the respondents'
copyrights. 55 This permissive ruling allowed the marketplace and law
to adapt to paradigm-shifting technology to benefit artists, consumers,
and the industry.
56
2. Grokster: Ossifying Policy
The Grokster decision and its aftermath exemplify what can
occur when the government uses its power to resolve a nascent conflict
without considering the possibility of future change.57 In Grokster, the
parties called upon the Court to resolve a conflict between copyright
holders-including songwriters, music publishers, and movie
studios-and Grokster, Ltd. 58 Grokster distributed free peer-to-peer
software that enabled users to share any type of digital file directly
with one another without using a centralized server.
59
Grokster acknowledged that a majority of its network users
engaged in the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted files, but the
50. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
51. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
52. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434.
53. Id. at 417.
54. Id. at 459.
55. Id. at 443-46, 498.
56. See infra Part II.E.
57. See Metro -Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
58. Id. at 913.
59. Id. at 920.
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district court and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
nonetheless found that the software was capable of substantial
non-infringing uses. 60  The Supreme Court reversed, enjoining
Grokster from operating, and a decade of industry scandal ensued. 61
II. ANALYSIS OF THE TERRESTRIAL RADIO-INTERNET RADIO
ASYMMETRY IN PERFORMANCE ROYALTIES AND GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGY-TRIGGERED COPYRIGHT ISSUES
As the recording industry has grown, changed, and shrunk
since the 1976 Act, major industry participants and Congress have
tried to change the laws, policies, and agreements that control the
industry.62 These changes left anachronisms in their wake, including
an asymmetry in the performance rights and royalties associated with
compositions and sound recordings. 63  Terrestrial radio has
progressed-or regressed, depending on one's point of view-from a
promotional tool to a mere source of free music. 64 But Congress should
not intervene hastily in this situation; instead, the DPRA should serve
as a case study in unintended consequences. 65
A. The Rationale Underlying the Performance-Right Asymmetry
During negotiations for the DPRA, advocates for
terrestrial radio stations argued that digital radio and over-the-air
60. Id. at 914, 933-34. The Court summarized the lower court's reasoning and the
doctrine of substantial nonfringing uses:
[T]he distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial noninfringing uses
could not give rise to contributory liability for infringement unless the distributor had
actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement and failed to act on that
knowledge. Because the appeals court found respondents' software to be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses and because respondents had no actual knowledge of
infringement owing to the software's decentralized architecture, the court held that
they were not liable.
Id.
61. Id. at 913-14; see infra Part II.E. The Court explained:
One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright,
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,
going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the
device's lawful uses.
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913-14.
62. Id.
63. This history includes all of the file-sharing cases, the DPRA, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), and RIAA prosecutions. See Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 114; Heather Neaveill, The RIAA Versus the
People: A File-Sharing Witch Hunt, 21 DCBA BRIEF 24, 24 (2009).
64. See infra Part I.B.
65. See infra Part III.
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radio are fundamentally different.66 They asked Congress to retain
the terrestrial radio broadcasters' exemption from the
performance-royalty requirement for sound recordings, and Congress
obliged.
67
One primary motivation for maintaining the status quo for
sound recordings on terrestrial radio was that the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary-presumably based largely on the arguments from
broadcasters' lobbyists-feared damaging terrestrial radio's economic
interests.68  The committee reported hearing, "concern[s] ... that
granting a performance right in sound recordings would make it
economically infeasible for some transmitters to continue certain
current uses of sound recordings." 69 Broadcasters were indeed hostile
to the idea of paying for the use of both the recording and the
composition, in part because they perceived their stations as spurring
sales.7 0  Major radio-station broadcasters were already paying
hundreds of millions of dollars in performance royalties for
compositions, and they were unwilling to double that number.
7 1
B. Times Have Changed; Radio Serves a Different Function
Congress's decision to exclude terrestrial radio broadcasters
from paying performance royalties to the sound-recording owners is an
anomaly of American intellectual property law.72 The United States is
the world-wide leader in terms of the music business, yet it is the one
nation that does not require remuneration for over-the-air broadcasts
of sound recordings."
73
66. See Kilgore, supra note 44, at 563 (citing Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1506 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Prop. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights)) (noting the continued objection to an extension of performance right in sound
recordings by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the interactive nature of
Internet radio).
67. See Kilgore, supra note 44, at 563-64.
68. See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 16 (1995).
69. Id.
70. See Debbie Bush, Taking a Stand: Protecting Local Radio Stations, 14 NEWS,
http://www.14news.com/global/story.asp?s=11971775 (last updated Feb. 11, 2010, 3:20 PM).
71. ARNOLD P. LUTZKER, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS FOR MEDIA PROFESSIONALS 115
(Focal Press 1997).
72. See William Henslee, What's Wrong with U.S.?: Why the United States Should Have
a Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 739, 752 (2011)
(quoting Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the Performance Right and Platform
Parity for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 28 (2007) (statement of Marybeth Peters));
supra Part I.B.
73. Henslee, supra note 72, at 752.
2013]
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Congress bases its refusal to extend a performance right to
over-the-air broadcasts partially on the fact that airplay traditionally
has been a source of free music-promotion that presents record labels'
products to millions of potential consumers. 74 For some time, scholars
have been predicting that the rationale behind the laws that "unfairly
advantage" traditional broadcasters would one day come into serious
question. 75 That time is now.
For much of the twentieth century, radio legitimately
influenced the popularity of music, and music-ranking services like
Billboard measured music's popularity by its radio play.76 Payola
schemes in the 1940s and 1950s evidenced that the recording industry
used radio to introduce its music to an audience that would pay for it
in other forms. 77 This promotional-radio paradigm has shifted in
recent years, eroding the reasoning behind the sound-recording
exemption from the receipt of performance royalties. 78
One major indicator of this shift away from terrestrial radio
being a singular promotional tool for record labels is the development
of Billboard's new ranking scheme. 79 Billboard began ranking several
of its music categories by considering digital-download sales from
online marketplaces like iTunes and streaming data from services like
Spotify and Rhapsody instead of radio play.80 This new methodology
74. Parity, Platforms, and Protection: The Future of the Music Industry in the Digital
Radio Revolution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 101 (2006)
[hereinafter Digital Radio Revolution Hearing] (statement of Gary Parsons, Chairman of the
Board of Directors, XM Satellite Radio Inc.); see Henslee, supra note 72, at 750 (noting that
nearly every industrialized country besides the United States requires broadcast radio to pay
performance royalties to the owners of sound recordings).
75. See Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue?: An Exploration of the Status and Merit of
a General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 181, 188
n. 112 (2003) (citing Brad Stone, Greetings Earthlings: Satellite Radio for Cars Is Taking Off and
Adding New Features - Now Broadcasters Are Starting to Fight Back, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004,
at 55); infra Part III (arguing for a private-sector solution until such time that legislation is
necessary to bring holdout stations into conformity).
76. See, e.g., Billboard Shakes Up Genre Charts with New Methodology, BILLBOARD
(Oct. 11, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/record-labelsfbillboard-shakes-
up-genre-charts-with-new-1007978302.story (describing the evolution of Billboard's ranking
methodology).
77. Payola was the practice of song pluggers paying disc jockeys to play their artists'
songs. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2012) (outlawing payola schemes); TYLER COHEN, IN PRAISE OF
COMMERCIAL CULTURE 164, 166 (2000).
78. Cf. Digital Radio Revolution Hearing, supra note 74, at 101 (statement of Gary
Parsons, Chairman of the Board of Directors, XM Satellite Radio Inc.) (describing Congress's
rationale behind limiting performance royalties in sound recordings to digital radio).
79. See, e.g., Jon Freeman, Billboard Introduces New Chart Methodology, MuSIC Row






keeps terrestrial radio data as one of its factors, but it becomes just
that, a factor no different than digital-streaming data.81 Justifying its
switch to this new methodology, Billboard's Director of Charts
explained that "[t]he way people consume music continues to evolve
and as a result so do our genre charts, which now rank the many new
ways fans experience, listen to[,] and buy music."
8 2
Country starlet Taylor Swift's 2012 hit, "We Are Never Ever
Getting Back Together" illustrates the decline of terrestrial radio as a
promotional medium.8 3 It hit number one on Billboard's Hot Country
chart using the new methodology, while sitting at number thirty-six
on Billboard's Country Airplay chart, which measures terrestrial radio
play.8 4 The broader success of a song receiving relatively limited
air-time suggests that times have changed.
8 5
Label support or established fan bases might explain the
ability of an established artist like Swift to bypass terrestrial radio
play on the way to the top of the charts, but lesser-known artists have
done the same.86 Little Big Town, a country act with significantly less
industry clout than Swift,8 7 nabbed a number one single on the
Billboard's Country Digital Songs chart with "Pontoon."'8 At the time,
"Pontoon" was at a mere number twenty on the charts measured by
radio airplay.8 9
In an attempt to justify their recalcitrant opposition to a full
performance right in sound recordings, broadcasters assert that "radio
[is] an invaluable asset to communities" and that "stations generate
six billion dollars in public service annually, and provide vital news
and community information to listeners."90  While radio performs






86. See, e.g., Wade Jessen, Little Big Town Gets First No. 1 Single of Its Decade-Long
Career-From Fans, Not Radio, BILLBOARDBIz (July 12, 2012, 5:33 PM),
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/others/little-big-town-gets-first-no-1-single-of- 1007564152.story.
87. See Zack O'Malley Greenburg, Country Cash Kings 2013: Toby Keith Leads List of
Top Earners, FORBES (July 1, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
zackomalleygreenburg/2013/07/O1/country-cash-kings-2013-toby-keith-leads-list-of-top-earners
(ranking Taylor Swift at number two and leaving Little Big Town off of the list).
88. See Jessen, supra note 86.
89. See id.
90. See Kilgore, supra note 44, at 575 (citing STOP THE PERFORMANCE TAX,
http://www.noperformancetax.org).
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music radio stations bring in significantly more revenue than their
purely public-service counterparts. 91
On average, music-oriented radio stations realize 50 percent
more annual revenue than their non-music counterparts. 92 Professor
Henslee analyzed the revenue that labels and artists could generate
from performance royalties from terrestrial radio, and on average,
commercial radio stations that utilize music predict annual revenues
of $675,000, while non-music stations predict annual revenues of
$450,000-a 50 percent difference. 93  While the recording industry
deflated at the turn of the millennium, radio seemed to have been
insulated from the digital switch and the recession.94 According to a
US Government Accountability Office study, radio-a $20 billion
industry95-owes a substantial portion of its revenue to sound
recordings and musical content. 96
Admittedly, the revenue generated for sound-recording owners
will come directly from broadcasters' profits, but "this is not in itself a
compelling reason" for broadcasters to avoid payment. 97 After all, one
of the most basic notions underlying American property rights is that
private property cannot be taken from its owner without
compensation.
98
C. Attempted Government Solutions and Their Drawbacks
Congress has discussed legislation that would eliminate the
asymmetry between the performance right in sound recordings on
Internet and terrestrial radio to remedy the administrative quagmire
91. See Henslee, supra note 72, at 760 (citing U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-10-826, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE PROPOSED PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT WOULD RESULT
IN ADDITIONAL COSTS FOR BROADCAST RADIO STATIONS AND ADDITIONAL REVENUE FOR RECORD
COMPANIES, MUSICIANS, AND PERFORMERS 6, 14 (2010)).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Kilgore, supra note 44, at 575 (citing Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R.
848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 192 (2009), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/11 lth/11 1-8_47922.pdf (statement of Mitch Bainwol,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Recording Industry Association of America)); supra Part
I.A.
95. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-826, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE
PROPOSED PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT WOULD RESULT IN ADDITIONAL COSTS FOR BROADCAST
RADIO STATIONS AND ADDITIONAL REVENUE FOR RECORD COMPANIES, MUSICIANS, AND
PERFORMERS 11 (2010).
96. See Henslee, supra note 72, at 760.
97. Kilgore, supra note 44, at 575.
98. See Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 192 (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/
111th111-8 47922.pdf (statement of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Recording Industry Association of America), at 192.
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that the DPRA created.99 As described above, when the CRB handed
down its first ruling, many webcasters experienced royalty-rate
increases between 300 and 1,200 percent.100 This dramatic change
based on the "willing-buyer/willing-seller" standard provoked
outrage. 101 For instance, Pandora Media, Inc., creator of the Pandora
Internet radio service, argues that the rates the CRB established hurt
their business model.102  Additionally, BMI, a performing-rights
organization, filed a rate action against Pandora after negotiations for
increased fees did not result in an agreement. 0 3 Pandora, BMI, and
other industry actors could have avoided the wild fluctuations in
CRB-established royalty rates if the government had allowed
technology and negotiations to advance before ossifying the market. 104
The argument that traditional broadcasters enjoy an unfair
advantage because they do not have to pay performance royalties to
sound-recording owners is certainly not novel. 05 In a move that
demonstrates how apparent the asymmetry has become, in June 2013,
Pandora even purchased a small terrestrial radio station in South
Dakota just to try to qualify for terrestrial rates.106 Congress has
introduced bills attempting to create a full performance right, and
scholars have speculated hopefully about such bills' eventual
passages. 10 7 But each time a new bill is introduced, the stalemate of
interest groups on each side of the issue helps to prevent its signature
into law. 08 The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), for
99. See Robertson, supra note 43, at 544 (introducing the means by which the
government handles the administration of mandatory performance royalties with Internet
radio).
100. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
101. See Lawmakers Zero in on AM/FM Royalties, RADIOINK (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.radioink.com/ARTICLE.ASP?ID=2583077 (noting that Pandora finds the rates
unfair).
102. See id. (explaining that Pandora accounts for approximately 7 percent of radio
listening in the United States, but more than half of its revenue is paid to SoundExchange).
103. Press Release, Broadcast Music, Inc., BMI Files Rate Action Against Pandora (June
13, 2013) (available at http://www.bmi.com/press/entry/561960).
104. See infra Part III.
105. See supra Part II.B.
106. See Julianne Pepitone, Pandora Buys South Dakota Radio Station in Bid for Lower
Fees, CNN MONEY (June 11, 2013, 9:17 PM) http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/11/technology/
pandora-buys-radio-stationindex.html.
107. See, e.g., Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009); Kilgore, supra note
44, at 564-65, 580 (describing and arguing in favor of the Performance Rights Act, a bill seeking
to create a full performance right in sound recordings).
108. See Brooks Boliek, Performance Rights Act on Repeat, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2011, 4:45
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/49194.html (indicating that the Performance
Rights Act failed in the 111th Congress and also noting arguments on both sides of the issue);
see, e.g., Debbie Bush, Taking a Stand: Protecting Local Radio Stations, 14 NEWS (Feb. 11, 2010,
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instance, holds firm to its assertion that "a [public-performance]
royalty in sound recordings would be a death tax, forcing many
broadcast networks to go out of business." 10 9  While Part II.B
demonstrated that this argument is flawed-music radio stations have
significantly higher profits than non-music stations-sound-recording
owners have yet to convince groups like NAB.110
D. The Holdout Problem
Legislation may well become necessary because of the holdout
problem inherent in many situations involving many actors.11' This
problem is especially pronounced when some parties are primarily
motivated by non-financial concerns. 112  Clear Channel's recent
agreements with record companies illustrate that big radio stations
are increasingly willing to cooperate. 113 This cooperation could either
signal a willingness to support a law or at least a business-minded
notion of fairness toward the music creators, but it also may set the
stage for small stations to hold out.1 1 4
To explain this holdout problem, consider the example of
government land-assembly programs. 115 As the government attempts
to acquire land for public use, large inefficiencies arise.116 It is unclear
whether individuals who are unwilling to sell their land refuse to do so
based on "strategic holdout behavior"-wanting a higher price-or a
"more genuine disagreement arising because a buyer's offer is below a
seller's reservation price," a moral consideration.1 1 7 The holdout may
2:28 PM), http://www.14news.com/global/story.asp?s=11971775 (describing the argument against
the Performance Rights Act from the perspective of local radio stations).
109. See Henslee, supra note 72, at 759 (citing Copyright Issues: Cable Television and
Performance Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 293 (1979) (statement of Sis Kaplan,
President, National Association of Broadcasters) (stating that any effort to pay for performance
right in sound recordings would upset the delicate balance between broadcasters and artists)).
110. See id.
111. See John Cadigan et al., An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a
Multilateral Bargaining Game, 76 S. ECON. J. 444, 444 (2009).
112. See id. at 449.
113. Ed Christman, Exclusive: Clear Channel, Big Machine Strike Deal to Pay Sound-
Recording Performance Royalties to Label, Artists, BILLBOARD.BIZ (June 5, 2012),
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/legal-and-management/exclusive-clear-channel-big-
machine-strike-1007226762.story ("We found a way to create the terrestrial artist performance
right.... We found a ground in the middle to move forward into the future as a partner with
radio." (quoting Scott Borchetta, Chief Executive Officer, Big Machine Label Group)).
114. See id.
115. See Cadigan, supra note 111, at 444.




increase the reservation price to extort the buyer. 118 This problem is
the main rationale behind eminent domain, in which the government,
to acquire the remaining land, pays just compensation to the holdouts
based on a fair market value. 119
The holdout problem may eventually apply to the
broadcast-radio industry. 120 Clear Channel started negotiating deals
with labels establishing royalty payments for the performance of
sound recordings. 121 Entercom followed suit, and it is likely that other
large-volume station owners will do so, as well.122 Eventually,
however, local radio stations that view the performance royalty as a
"death tax" will refuse to sign agreements, no matter how reasonable
the rate may be. 123 If the market cannot prevent holdouts from
freeriding on the good-faith negotiations of the larger stations, then a
solution to the holdout problem could involve legislative
intervention.124 If Congress gets involved too early, however, it could
prematurely ossify mutually beneficial free-market negotiations.
25
E. When Government Ossifies Markets
If legislators or courts develop laws that prevent industries
from progressing in reaction to technology and the economic
environment, negative consequences-similar to the inefficiencies that
have arisen in the Internet radio context-could result.126 Sony and
118. Cf. Julie Niederhoff & Panos Kouvelis, Generous, Spiteful, or Profit Maximizing
Suppliers in the Wholesale Price Contract: A Behavioral Study 2 (Nov. 1, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2173555 (finding that sellers' prices sometimes reflect spite, not pure
profit- maximization).
119. See Cadigan, supra note 111, at 445.
120. See id.
121. See Christman, supra note 113.
122. Now Entercom Inks Side Deal with Big Machine Label Group, RADIOINK (Sept. 19,
2012), http:/www.radioink.com/article.asp?id=2536579.
123. See Henslee, supra note 72, at 759 (citing Copyright Issues: Cable Television and
Performance Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 293 (1979) (statement of Sis Kaplan,
President, National Association of Broadcasters)).
124. See infra Part III.
125. See infra Part III.
126. Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(allowing VTRs to exist), and Thomas K. Arnold, 2012 Home Entertainment Revenue Stabilizes,
HOME MEDIA MAC. (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.homemediamagazine.com/research/2012-home-
entertainment-revenue-stabilizes-29271 (describing a thriving multi-billion dollar industry),
with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (enjoining the
file-sharing service Grokster), and supra Part I (describing the depressed state of the recording
industry).
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Grokster are helpful in demonstrating the cost of error in acting too
soon and ossifying policy. 127
In Sony, the Court held that the district court was correct in
finding that the VTR was still useful for legally recording
non-copyrighted material or copyrighted material with consent. 128
The Court was unwilling to outlaw the devices and deprive consumers
of the benefits of this new technology. 129 If the Court had decided the
other way--outlawing the sale of video-recording devices-the
multi-billion-dollar home-entertainment industry might never have
developed a substantial fraction of its value. 130 While this policy
rationale is not explicitly indicated in Sony, the Court's reasoning and
history tend to show that policy considerations influenced the
majority.131 The Court notes that time-shifting use of the VTR
"enlarges the television viewing audience."1 32  Additionally, two
rounds of arguments occurred in two separate terms of the Supreme
Court before it released its opinion. 133 By the time the Court heard
the second round of arguments, "approximately 10 percent of US
households owned [VTRs]."134 It is nearly unimaginable that this rise
in popularity did not play some role in the Court's decision.13 5
The Grokster case involved similar circumstances with a much
different outcome. 136 In reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision that
Grokster was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, the Court
distinguished the Sony decision, relying on evidence of Grokster's
intent that those who downloaded its software would use it to share
copyrighted works.13 7 In Sony, the Court had a survey showing 9
percent of video recordings were authorized (i.e., non-infringing), and
the Court noted a "significant potential for future authorized
copying."138  In Grokster, there was a similar percentage of
non-infringing uses (10 percent), but the fact that Grokster intended
127. See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
128. See Sony, 464 U.S. 427, 454-55.
129. See id.
130. See Arnold, supra note 126 (describing the income generated in 2012 by home
entertainment).
131. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 972
(2007).
132. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
133. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 131, at 962-73.
134. Id. at 969.
135. See id.
136. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005)
(enjoining Grokster's continued operation).




to allow users to share copyrighted works proved to be the deciding
factor in the Court's ruling.
139
While it remains unclear what future negotiations and
agreements the entertainment industry might have entered with
Grokster and other peer-to-peer services, the Grokster decision
effectively outlawed an efficient distribution method and started the
chain of events that caused a large population of would-be music
consumers to develop a passionate aversion to labels. 140 While the
Sony majority arguably considered strongly the growing popularity of
the VTR and similar home video devices (e.g., Betamax and VCR), the
Court did not consider the popularity of peer-to-peer music sharing
when deciding Grokster.41 The Grokster litigation and the Recording
Industry Association of America's (RIAA) ensuing litigation campaign
led to public backlash and perhaps a lost opportunity to make efficient
use of file- sharing technologies. 
142
Without the Grokster decision, the copyright holders may have
had an incentive to resolve the pirating issue in a commercial manner
instead of a legal one.1 43 Like the movie industry after Sony, the
music industry could have an opportunity to privately solve the
asymmetry between digital and terrestrial radio royalties until such
time that only holdout radio stations remain, at which point the
government could still act.
144
III. A PRIVATE SOLUTION AND WHY THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD STAY
OUT FOR Now
After discussing the rationales behind extending performance
royalties in sound recordings to terrestrial radio, the question
remains: How can the recording industry accomplish such an
139. See id. at 939-40.
140. See Heather Neaveill, The RIAA Versus the People: A File-Sharing Witch Hunt, 21
DCBA BRIEF 24, 24 (2009).
141. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 131, at 969.
142. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010)
(illustrating that the RIAA turned its strategy to suing individual file-sharers); Daniel Reynolds,
The RLAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives More Compatible with Public
Morality, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 977, 977 n.44 (2008) (noting that the RIAA's lawsuit
campaign is seen as subversive toward the rights of the public).
143. Maggie A. Lange, Digital Music Distribution Technologies Challenge Copyright Law:
A Review of RLAA v. MP3.com and RIAA v. Napster, 45 BOS. B.J. 14, 14 (2001) (describing, in the
midst of new file-sharing technology's popularity, the lack of a consumer-friendly digital
download service). This Note does not describe the likelihood of a commercial solution-nor does
it advocate for illegal file sharing. It merely indicates that the industry and the file-sharing
network developers were prevented from negotiating an efficient solution because of the ruling,
which was completely in favor of the recording industry.
144. See infra Part III.
2013] 215
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
industry-altering shift in a way that promotes the best interest of all
parties? 145 The answer to that question is chiefly through private
contracts and negotiations. 1
46
Without the give-and-take of discussions between industry
players, Congressional or judicial misaction will only ossify the
existing tensions in a manner that could ultimately harm the
industry.147 The lessons of Sony and Grokster show that allowing
private contracting around the problems of performance royalties is
preferable until a holdout problem develops. 148 Moreover, agreements
such as Big Machine Label Group's deals with Clear Channel and
Entercom are prime indicators of the direction the industry will take if
left alone. 1
49
A. The Cost of Premature Government Intervention
The rationale behind allowing private industry players to
negotiate the transition to performance royalties in sound recordings
on terrestrial radio can be explained easily: if the government gets the
solution wrong, then the law may prevent the industry from acting
efficiently towards its best interests in the future.150 Comparing the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sony and Grokster illustrates the cost of
such a governmental intrusion. 151
For example, when Congress decided to require
performance-royalty payments to sound-recording owners from
Internet streaming services, it inserted itself into a sphere where
sophisticated parties could have negotiated rates that were acceptable
to each party.152 Instead, the copyright owners and Internet
businesses today are still feeling DPRA's one-side negative effects on
streaming service providers. 153
Under the current statutory system, the CRB determines the
fees that online-webcasting services pay to copyright holders based on
145. See supra Part II.B.
146. See infra Part III.A.3.
147. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); supra Part II.E.
148. See supra Part JI.D-E.
149. See supra Part II.D; infra Part III.B.
150. See supra Part II.A (describing the problems with the DPRA and the willing-
buyer/willing-seller standard).
151. See infra Part III.A.1-2.
152. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2012).
153. See Lawmakers Zero in on AM/FM Royalties, supra note 101.
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a supposed fair market value.' 54 The CRB applies the "willing
buyer/willing seller" standard to establish rates based on fair market
value.' 55 In other words, the standard is supposed to approximate
what the parties would negotiate without the statutory license. 156
From there, the streaming services pay SoundExchange, which pays
performing-rights organizations and labels. 157 The performing-rights
organizations then distribute the income to music publishers and
songwriters, and labels distribute to their artists.158
As noted above, Internet service companies have complained
that the government-determined and enforced rates they pay to labels
and artists are prohibitively high, and performing-rights organizations
claim that the rates are not high enough. 15 9 If the rates were subject
to real negotiations instead of beholden to statutory mandate, the
negotiated rates would be fluid and, hopefully, eventually arrive at a
compromised middle-ground that would be mutually beneficial to
copyright holders and Internet services. 60
B. The Solution is in the Private Sector
To avoid legal-ossification problems, the government should
leave the resolution of the issue to the marketplace where solutions
are quickly developing. 61 The cost of error in resolving the issue
incorrectly is high. 162 As in the buildup to Grokster, the recording
industry now faces an issue of revenue-stream mismatches between
industry players. 163 If the government uses its power to resolve that
issue like it did in Grokster, labels could lose the ability to efficiently
154. See Performance Rights and Digital Royalties Heat Up in Congress,
SOUNDEXCHANGE BLOG (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.soundexchange.con/performance-rights-
and-digital-royalties-heat-up-in-congress-2.
155. See id.; supra Part II.B.
156. See Performance Rights and Digital Royalties Heat Up in Congress, supra note 152;
supra Part II.B.
157. See About, supra note 38.
158. See The Music Royalty Breakdown, INDIE AND UNSIGNED (Apr. 3, 2012),
http://www.indieandunsigned.com/the-music-royalty-breakdown.
159. See Lawmakers Zero in on AMI/FM Royalties, supra note 101 (explaining that
Pandora accounts for approximately 7 percent of radio listening in the United States, but more
than half of its revenue is paid to SoundExchange).
160. See Performance Rights and Digital Royalties Heat Up in Congress, supra note 154.
161. See Christman, supra note 113; Dan Rys, Clear Channel Inks Second Radio
Royalties Label Deal, This Time with Glassnote, BILLBOARDBIz (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:41 PM),
http://www.billboard.bizfbbbiz/industry/radio/clear-channel-inks-second-radio-royalties
1007962302.story (describing the deal struck between Clear Channel and Glassnote).
162. See supra Part II.E.
163. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005);
see supra Part I.B.
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exploit a valuable revenue stream, much like the music and movie
industries lost the ability to explore the commercial possibilities of the
distribution system in Grokster.
164
Using the Clear Channel and Entercom deals as examples,
labels and media groups should solve the performance-royalty
asymmetry contractually. 165 There is substantial tension between
industry actors about the royalty-payment gap between the Internet
and terrestrial radio. 166  The industry has a strong incentive to
alleviate the tension through these agreements to ensure that a
situation like that developing around CRB determinations of Internet
royalties does not occur again for terrestrial radio. 167
As an example of this ongoing dialogue, not only is Big
Machine Label Group pushing radio conglomerates to sign
performance-royalty deals, but Clear Channel also recently signed a
deal with another label group for the same purpose.1 68 In September
2012, Clear Channel entered into a partnership with Glassnote
Entertainment Group to pay to the label and its artists performance
royalties for its terrestrial radio stations.' 69 This is important because
Glassnote's lineup included several major acts that have garnered
significant radio airtime. 170  Coming only months after the Big
Machine deal, this development may have signaled to the rest of the
industry that these agreements are the way of the future.1 71
The recording industry's innovative efforts to deal with the
terrestrial radio gap provide all the more reason for the government to
refrain from regulating unless intervention becomes imminently
necessary. 172 The courts and Congress should treat this situation as a
Sony issue rather than a Grokster issue.1 73 Icing the market in this
164. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940-41.
165. See Christman, supra note 113 (describing the deal between Clear Channel and Big
Machine); Rys, supra note 159 (describing the deal struck between Clear Channel and Glassnote,
coming just three months after the first deal with Big Machine).
166. See Henslee, supra note 72, at 746, 749.
167. See Rys, supra note 161; see also Henslee, supra note 72, at 762-63; supra Part I.B.
168. See Rys, supra note 161 (describing the deal struck between Clear Channel and
Glassnote).
169. See id.
170. See id. (noting that Glassnote's artists include Mumford & Sons, Phoenix, and Two
Door Cinema).
171. See id.
172. See id.; Christman, supra note 113. While courts-besides, of course, the Supreme
Court-cannot decide what cases come before them, they can make narrow rulings after taking
policy into account.
173. See supra Part III.A.
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arena could have grand negative effects on an industry that may not
survive added crisis.
1 74
As noted above, achieving symmetry in the performance right
in sound recordings may eventually require congressional
intervention. 175 Where other scholars miss the point is that legislation
is a solution to the final holdout problem, not the solution to the entire
royalty asymmetry.
176
Like in the land-assembly context, in which many landowners
would voluntarily sell their land, many station owners would agree to
pay performance royalties for the use of sound recordings on their
stations. 77 Rather than assembling contiguous land for public use,
the challenge here is to assemble fractions of the individual radio
stations' profit streams. 178  In the land-assembly situation, some
landowners inevitably will refuse to sell on principles independent of
economics. 179  When this inefficiency arises in the radio-station
context-in other words, when small stations that consider the
performance royalty a "death tax" are the only remaining unlicensed
stations freeriding on the other stations' performance royalty
payments-congressional intervention will become appropriate.
80
The form of that intervention should be much like the eminent
domain context.181 Through eminent domain, the government is
required to pay landowners "just compensation" for the forced sale of
their lands.182 This Note's last-resort legislative solution involves the
government requiring the holdout radio stations to pay a reasonable
royalty to sound-recording owners.18 3 This reasonable royalty-either
a flat rate or a percentage of revenue-should mirror closely the
average prices in the deals made by the stations that voluntarily pay
the performance royalty. 8 4 This method is nominally similar to the
so-called "willing-buyer/willing-seller" standard the CRB uses for
Internet radio royalty determinations, but it has the advantage of
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See supra Part II.D.
176. See, e.g., Henslee, supra note 72 at 763-65 (suggesting a full performance right in
sound recordings and advocating for the passage of the Performance Rights Act).
177. See supra Part II.D.
178. See supra Part II.D.
179. See supra Part II.D.
180. See Henslee, supra note 72, at 769.
181. See Brett Talley, Restraining Eminent Domain Through Just Compensation: Kelo v.
City of New London, 127 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 759, 759 (2006).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Talley, supra note 181, at 759.
183. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184. But see Henslee, supra note 72 (advocating for the Performance Rights Act, which
establishes the royalty scheme without the benefit of knowledge from years of successful private
negotiation).
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relying on a market that would actually include willing buyers and
sellers.1 8
5
The legislation here, though, would avoid the problems the
CRB has faced.186 Congress enacted the DPRA before the creation of
services like Pandora-making it impossible to establish a reasonable
royalty upon which to base a "willing-buyer/willing-seller" standard of
calculation.187 The last-resort legislation this Note proposes will have
the advantage of relying on a developed free-market standard to make
its rate determinations.1SS
IV. CONCLUSION
The recording industry has been dealing with the aftermath of
the digitalization of music and its dissemination across the Internet
since the end of the twentieth century. As business models develop
and change, new ways of creating revenue streams that incentivize
music creation and financial investment in that creation must have
room to develop as well. As these business models evolve, new
technologies will inevitably appear that lawmakers did not anticipate.
The government may be tempted to prematurely respond to these
changes because of pressure from industry lobbyists, but the impetus
for finding an answer to the asymmetry between terrestrial radio and
Internet radio should instead fall on industry players acting in the
private sector.
US copyright law has never provided for a full performance
royalty in sound recordings, but the old rationales no longer justify the
asymmetry. The arguments for the full performance right may tempt
the government to codify that right, but based on the continuing
complexities of the DPRA's performance right for
sound-recording performances over the Internet, a legislative
approach here will likely lead to a similar sub-optimal result. Thus,
the private sector holds the key to a satisfactory solution.
Labels like Big Machine Label Group and Glassnote
Entertainment Group in conjunction with radio conglomerates like
Clear Channel and Entercom are leading the way in the push for
extending performance royalties in sound recordings to terrestrial
radio.18 9  By signing deals with radio conglomerates like Clear
185. Performance Rights and Digital Royalties Heat Up in Congress, supra note 154.
186. See supra Part I.B.
187. See supra Part I.B.
188. Performance Rights and Digital Royalties Heat Up in Congress, supra note 154.
189. See Glenn Peoples, Stakes Are High as Labels, Broadcasters Lobby over Performance




Channel and Entercom, labels and artists are able to tap into a new
revenue stream to make up for the income they lost when music went
digital. Barring government intervention, this private-agreement
trend will most likely continue until a holdout problem arises. Then,
perhaps Congress can one day pass a law codifying the bargain agreed
upon by members of the industry to remedy the holdout problem.
J.P. Urban*
the money spent by several labels and broadcast groups to lobby Congress regarding
performance royalties); Rys, supra 161 (stating Clear Channel has signed its second deal with an
independent record label, teaming up with Glassnote Entertainment Group to pay out digital
and terrestrial revenues to the label and its artists); supra Part II.B.
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